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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
All italics are our:-;.
l\:lyrna Rodriguez, a Ininor, by her guardian, her
mother, brought this action against Hazel Chase, the
defendant, for personal injuries. She suffered these injuries on account of an accident which occurred whilf:'
she was riding as a guest on a motorcycle driven by
one Y ern on Green on July 5, 1958. The motorcycle was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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going north on I Street, a through highway, and the
automobile driven by Hazel Chase was being driven in
a westerly direction on Eleventh A venue.
The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that defendant
(a)
(b)
(c)

Failed to yield right of \Yay.
Failed to keep a proper lookout.
Failed to remain stopped at the stop sign
on the east side of I Street until the motorcycle on which plaintiff was riding had
crossed the intersection.
(d) Failed to keep her automobile under proper
control.
(e) Operated said autmnobile crossing said intersection at a speed too high for existing
conditions. (R. 1-3).

Defendant answered plaintiffs' complaint and admitted only that there was an accident, and denied any
negligence on the part of the defendant, and claimed
that plaintiff's injury \Yas caused by the negligence of
\'"ern on Green, her host driver, and also defendant
elaimed plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
(R. 6).
The case carne on for pretrial on the 19th day of
February, 1959. Plaintiffs' and defendant's contentions
were set out at the pretrial. Yery little ·was stipulated
to except as to the hospital bill. The defendant put the
plaintiff to her proof that I Street is a through street.
The case cmne on for trial the 22nd day of April,
1959. The jury was impaneled and proceeded to trial
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on that day, and continued on the 23rd and 24th.
The following is a list of exhibits offered in evidence.
Fnless otherwise indicated, they were received.
Exhibit 1, a map of the locality.
Exhibits 2 to 9, inclusive, plaintiffs' exhibits, photos
taken by plaintiff's witness Tipton of the locality.
Exhibits 10 through 13 were hospital records and
X-rays.
Exhibits 1-±, 15, 1G, and 17, photos of defendant's
car taken by Shipler.
Exhibits 18, 19, 20 and 21, defendant's photos of
motorcycle taken by defendant's witness Shipler.
Exhibit 22, U. S. "\veather report.
Exhibit 24, picture of plaintiff with cast on her leg.
Exhibits 25, 2G, and 27, photos of the locality taken
by defendant's witness Shipler.
Exhibits 28, 29, and 30, additional photos taken by
defendant's witness Shipler of defendant's car.
The plaintiff submitted request for instructionH.
Requested Instruction No. 1 was a request for a directed
verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant (R. 13).
"\Ye will set out those portions of the court's instruc-

tions excepted to by the plaintiff and also No. 11.
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A part of Im;truction No. 1
As a second affinnative defense the defendant alleges that the plaintiff herself was guilty
of contributory negligence which proximately
eontributed to her injuries and as a third affirmative defense that the plaintiff entered upon
the trip with her driver Vernon Green and that
she by reason of the circumstances assumed the
risk of injury and damage to her person under
<~ertain circumstances as follows:
(a) By continuing to ride on the Inotorcycle
w!1en it was being driven at an excessive rate of
:-;peed and in a n1anner showing that the driver
<'ould not control it, or bring it to a stop in the
{:)vent of danger; and
(b) Also by failing to protest and failing
to get off the vehicle before the accident occurred:
' R. 45--16).

Instruction No. ;)
The law recognizes unavoidable accidents. An
unavoidable accident is one which occurs in such
a 1nanner that it cannot justly be said to have
been proximately caused by negligence as those
tenns are herein defined. In the event a party is
da1naged by an unavoidable accident, he has no
right to recover, since the law requires that a
person be injured by the fault or negligence of
another as a prerequisite to any right to recover
dmnages. (R. 51)
Instruction No. 11
't ou are instructed that .Myrna Rodriguez,
the plaintiff, was a guest of Yernon Green on the
motorcycle at the time of the accident, and that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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any negligence, if any, of the driver of the motorcyele cannot he imputed to her.

The fact that Vernon Green is not a party
to this case should not be considered by you in
deterrnining any of the issues. (R. 58)
Instruction No.
}~vidence

1:~

has been received bearing on the

eondud of Green, driver of the 1notorcycle on
wnie:1 plaintiff, l\Iyrna RoJriguez, was riding at

the ti1ne of the accident. You should not pern1it
yoo.lr consideration of that evidence to direct your
attention away from the rule of law; namely,
that if the plaintiff i~ otherwise entitled to recover against the defendant, such right would not
be barred b)- negligence on the part of Gree11
unless such negligence, if any, was the sole proximate enuse of the accident.
r':vidence concerning Green's conduct has
lwc:1 received and is relevant in this case because

the defendant claims not only that said Green
was negligent, but that his negligence was the
sole proxiwale cause of the accident. If that
claim is true, then the defendant may not he held
liable.
How ever, if you find frmn the preponderance
of evidence that both :Mr. Green and the defendant, l\Irs. Chase, were negligent and the negligence of both was the proxirnate cause of the
accident, then you will find for the plaintiff unless
she 1ras also neglvgent which proximately contrilJuted t'J tl!f col!isi'on. (R. GO) (The italicized portion \',-[l;.< written in by rl2 court.)
Instruction No.

1()

T:1ere is a legal prineiple

(•omm<ml~·

refe1T0:l
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to by the term "assumption of risk," which is
as follows:
One is said to assume a risk when she voluntarily manifests her assent to the creation or
rnaintenance of a dangerous condition and voluntarily exposes herself to that danger, or when
she knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care
would know, that a danger exists in either the
condition of another, or in the condition, use, or
operation of property and voluntarily places
herself or remains, within the position of danger.
One who has thus assumed a risk is not
entitled to recover for damage caused her without
intention and which results fron1 the dangerous
condition or conduct to which she thus exposed
herself. (R. 63).
Instruction X o. 17
For clarification in reference to the question
of negligence respecting ~Irs. Chase, Vernon
Green, and :Myrna Rodriguez, if any, you are instructed that any negligence proximately causing
the incident in question would operate as follows:
1. If l\Irs. Chase is negligent and it proxirnately caused the injury to plaintiff then plaintiff can recover.

2. If :Mrs. Chase and ,~ern on Green were
both negligent and each proximately contributed
to the injury of the plaintiff, then the plaintiff
can recover.
3. If all three parties were negliJgent and
each proximately contributed to the plaintiff's
injuries then the plaiutiff cannot reco rer.
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4. If the plaintiff 'leas negligent and it was
a prox~'mate cause of her injuries she cannot
recover.
5. If Vernon Green was negligent and his
negligence was the sole proximate cause the
plaintiff cannot recover.
G. If the plaintiff assumed the risk of danger mentioned elsewhere in these instructi,ons
and i.t was the proximate cause of her injuries
she cannot recover.
Negligence without proximate cause createH
no legal liability upon the part of the person
who is negligent. (R. 64).
The case was submitted to the jury on April 2-!-.
1959, and it brought in a verdict of no cause of action
in favor of the ,defendant. The plaintiff filed her motion
for a new trial claiming:
1.

2.
3.
4.

The verdict was contrary to law
The verdict was contrary to the evidence
Errors in law, and
The court misdirected the jury in matters of
law·. (R. 74).

The n1otion for new trial was argued on September
15, 1959, and promptly denied (R. 76).
Then within the time allowed by law, the plaintiff
filed her appeal to the Supreme Court (R. 77). Plaintiff
made her designation of record (R. 82-83).
STATE1IENT OF THE FACTS
This accident occurred between 8 :30 and 8 :40 p.m.
on July 5, 1958. The plaintiff, 1fyrna Rodriguez, was a
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guest on a Inotorcycle driven by :Mr. Vernon Green.
rl,he defendant, I-Iazel Chase, was driving west 0'1
I1Jleventh Avenue. The probable point of in1pact according to Dean L. Eskridge, a police officer, was almost
in the exact center of the intersection.
l Street runs north and south and Is forty feet
fron1 curb to curb and it is a through street. Eleventh
Aven.ue is fifty feet wide from curb to curb and there
nrc stop signs on the northeast corner of Eleventh
};. venue facing westbound traffic and on the southwest
eorner of Eleventh .~A. venue facing eastbound traffi~?.
T,he grade up I Street toward Eleventh Avenue is from
13% to 13.2% {R. 87-102, see Exhibits 1 to 9 and :2;)
to 27).

Myrna Hodrir;uez, the plaintiff mmor, ',\-m' sixtee;1
:·etn·s old at the tinw of the accident. S~:e was born in
Puerto Rico. She had lived in Salt Lake City since she
was three years old and attended the public schools in
this Cit;-.
On July 5, 1958, she was living at 77:2 Second AveOn that date she had been visiting at a friend's house
and when she came hmne there was a motorcycle belonging to a .Mr. Vernon Green on the la"·n in front of her
home. She asked :Mr. Green to give her a ride and he said
he would. She had never known ~I r. Green before, and
had only ridden a Inotorcycle once before (R. 196-198).
m~e.

Vernon D. Green was twenty-eight years of age. He
was a 1notorcycle 1necl1anic and had been at that business
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!'or y('ar:-;. 1-lp had worked for the 0. & L. Equipn1ent
Company, nwtorcycle dealers, for two years. The motor·eyde he had that day was in good shape (R. 211-212).
and it was a motorcycle built for two people.
He took ~lyrna for a ride on the rnotorcycle and
they went west approxin1ately a quarter of a block from
her hmne and turned north to Third A venue and proceeded west. As he turned onto Third Avenue, he started
picking up speed and as he turned the corner :Myrna
Rodriguez, the plaintiff, said to slow down, and he said
"Okeh, I vvon't scare you." Then he pulled into a service
station and purchased fifty cents worth of gas. The~·
proceeded to I Street, stopped at the stop sign, and turned
north on I Street (R. 213). He went up I Street, and as he
came to the intersections he would slow down and usually
change gears. As they left Third A venue going up 1
~treet, the rnotorcycle was in second gear. In the center
of the block he would usually hit third gear, then as he
eame to an intt•n;ection he would slow down to second
gear and r~~e the gear as a brake rather than the foot
brake to slow df1\\"n. The speedorueter was working that
day. As t 1 1P:· approached Eleventh Avenue, the motort·::ele wa~ i:i1 second gear as the grade started to be steeper. and he was in second gear '''hen he reached the interR~ction of I Street and Eleventh A venue. Between Tenth
and Eleventh Avenue, in li[r. Green'~ opinion, he wa~
going about twenty-five rniles per hour (R. :Zl-l-216).
:Jlr. Green clailned when he first saw the Chase car it
]ooked like it "·a~ slowing down and rmning to a stop
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
(R. 217, 229 and 240), and this was about seventeen or
twenty feet east of the stop sign (R. 232). As Mr. Green
testified:
"Well, as I got about here I seen a car come
here and it looked like it was slowing down, coming to a stop, and as I entered the intersection,
I looked to the left again, knowing full well that
there was a stop sign there, and I more or less
took it for granted if I could see the car the car
could see me and !mowing it had a stop sign I
looked to the left to see if the traffic was coming
that way and clear and then I proceeded on and
the next thing I can remember is the car hitting
me." (R. 217).
Mr. Green estimated he was going approximately
twenty-five miles per hour as he approached the intersection on Eleventh Avenue and when he first observed
the Chase automobile, and his estimation of speed was
twenty miles per hour at the time of impact. His maxiInurn speed going north on I Street was thirty miles per
hour (R. 233-234). It was just dusk as they approached
Eleventh Avenue, and the lights of the motorcycle were
on and had been on since leaving the R.odriguez residence
(R. 224).
When the accident occurred, the Chase car hit the
last half of the motorcycle, from the engine back (R.
224). Mr. Green was severely injured in the accident in
the head, ann and shoulders. He was rendered unconscious and probably had a brain concussion (R. 226).
Frank A. Nichols, a schoolteacher living at 694
Imghth A venue, saw the motorcycle going north on I
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St rPPt. He watched the n1otorcycle go across the intersec-

tion of Eighth Avenue and about halfway up the next
block, and the motorcycle was traveling at a safe and
reasonable speed. He felt confident that this motorcycle
wa8 not going faster than thirty miles per hour (R. 160165).
The defendant, Hazel Chase, was called as an adverse
witness hy the plaintiff. She was sixty-nine and a half
years of age at the tilne of the accident, and had lived
all her life in Salt Lake City, and for the twelve years
preceding the trial had been Salt Lake County Recorder
(R.166-168). She was familiar with I Street and had been
familiar with it for many years, and she knew it was '1
through street on account of the fire department which
is located on the east side of I Street between Fourth
and Fifth A venue.
On July 5, 1958, she was driving her car, and her
brother, John Taggart, and her nephew, Michael Taggart,
a young boy, were in the front seat (R. 169). According
to her brother, John Taggart, he and his sister, the defendant ~Irs. Chase, were in the front seat and Michael
was in the back seat (R. 258). Mrs. Chase was very
familiar \vith the boulevard and she knew of the stop
sign at I Street and Eleventh Avenue, and she knew both
E Street and I Street and Eleventh Avenue. She knew
that a person had to be careful crossing those intersections. She knew that approaching I Street, the visibilit~·
is very poor. On that evening, notwithstanding it was a
warm night in exress of 72°, she claimed that her window:::
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were up (R. 169-171). 1frs. Chase claimed that she was
driving closer to the north side than to the center of the
road as she was going west on Eleventh A venue. Her
estirnated speed as she approached I Street was approximately twenty-five 1niles per hour. She made a complete
stop two or three feet east of the stop sign. She claimed
sh~ t1len looked to the left, that is down I Street, then she
looked to the north. She knew that on account of the
visibility, the dangerous approach at that intersection
\Vas from the south (see Exhibits :2 to 9). She claimed
that after looking toward the south, she looked to the
north and started across. She clai1ned she inched up to
where she could get a better view, then she started across
when she felt it was clear. She told Dean L. Eskridge,
the police officer, that immediately before the impact she
wa; going five to ten 1niles per hour (R. 139-140).
She didn't hear the roar of the Inotorcycle and she
didn't see any lights cmning over the hill (R. 171-178).
:\1rs. Lois Armstrong, who was right behind her, heard
the noise of the Inotorcycle (R. 149).
~1rs.

Chase claiined she inched out into the intersection and she looked to the left, that is down the hill.
~he didn't see the 1notorcycle until the crash. As she
~aid, "It caine out of the blue." She said she could just
:-;ee over the brow of the hill (R. 179). Notwithstanding
that she didn't see the motorcycle or hear its roar, she
elaimed her eyesight and hearing were very good. :Mrs.
Chase claimed the front of her car was in the intersection
when the motorcycle came. As she stated:
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"vVell, all I know 1 ·would say is that as I wa~
proceeding across to the center of the intersection
all of a sudden something carne right along and
right past the front part of rny car and it \Yas thi~
rnotorcycle." (R. 180-182) .
.Mr~. Cha~c stated to Dean L. I!Jskridge, a Salt Lake police
officer:

''I had stopped right still and I looked botlt
ways and this motorcycle can1e out of the blue.
I felt the motorcycle hit the car and fly across the
street. I had barely started up." (R. 137).
~~ rs. Chase testified that she had turned on her
lights on the boulevard quite a distance east of I Street.
She didn't see the motorcycle until, as she said, just about
the collision (R. 187). She applied her brakes as soon a~
the impact cmne (R. 189). Mrs. Chase claimed that she
stopped immediately after the accident, and said she had
not been saying a word to her passengers. She got out
of her car after the accident, walked over to the northwest
rorner, and heard the plaintiff, Myrna, saying:

"I told him not to go so fast. I told hirn not
to go so fast." (R. 193) .
.Mrs. Lois Armstrong, whose residence \\·as on the
corner of Eleventh Avenue and H Street, was going west
on Eleventh A venue several feet behind the Chase ca1·,
which had stopped for the stop sign at the intersection
of I Street and Eleventh Avenue. ~Irs. Armstrong wa~
driving well onto the north side of the traffic lane. Th<.)
Chase car proceeded through the intersection very slow1~·. and a~ it got to the center of the intersection she sa\\
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the front end of the nwtorcycle einerge frorn .the right side
of the Chase ~utomobile. The girl flew through the air
and the boy seemed to stay with the 1notorcycle.
As 1\frs. Armstrong said:
""I was just approaching the stop sign to make
1ny stop and I heard, I "·as Yery much aware of
the noise of the motorcycle, and I couldn't tell
where it was coming from. I could hear the noise,
I was very aware of the noise of the motorcycle,
but I couldn't determine which direction. And I
remember sitting there with an apprehensive feeling as a fire engine makes you feel when you hear
the noise that you don't see." (R. 149-151).
As ~lrs. Chase's car was just pulling away, ~Irs. Armstrong approached the stop sign and she heard the roar
of the nwtorcycle.
John Taggart, the brother of Mrs. Chase, is seventyfour years of age. He was riding in the front seat with
,\Irs. Chase. He didn't drive an automobile. However, he
did drive a 1nodel-T Ford thirty years ago (R. 259-260).
There was little conversation on his ride with :Mrs. Chase.
As they approached the intersection, :Jirs. Chase looked
down the hill and then she looked up the hill (R. 262~63). lie never heard the n1otorcycle until the crash. He
knew there was no danger coming fron1 the north because a person could see very clearly for several blocks
( R. 264). He saw a car on the opposite side of the street
going east, and didn't anticipate any danger coming from
that car. He

kne~.

from was from the

that the only place danger could come
~outh.
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The motoreyde after tl~e accident' went over to the
earb. T.ite Chase car went two or three feet. He heard
:\I~- rna hollering :
"Somebody come and help rne. I told him not
to go so fast. I told hirn not to go so fast."
lie quoted l\lr. Green:
"\\'e've got to get out of here.''
Charles J. Sorenson, on the evening of J ul:· 5, 1958,
~aw _l\lyrna Rodriguez, the plaintiff, lying prostrate between the curb and the sidewalk, an.d he saw 1Ir. Green
lying perfectly motionless in the gutter (R. 266-267). He
could hear the girl screaming and crying, and when he
got out she was still calling for help and crying. When
~lr. Green walked toward her, she said:
"I hate you, I hate you."
and:
"I told you you were going too fast" (R. 269).
Carl H. Ahnberg, a defense witness, was a hospital
attendant at the Y.A. Hospital at Fort Douglas. On the
evening of the accident he was driving a 1957 Chevrolet
automobile. His wife 'vas in the front seat and his
mother-in-law in the back seat. He was traveling east
on Eleve:1th A venue, and as he approached I Street
he saw a ear on the east side.· He said it was stopped on
the east side of I Street. l-Ie said it was parked in about
the n1iddle of the north half of the road. He said his car
\',·a~ about one hundred feet frorn the intersection and
f10 Cha:~e car started. It got jllst about to the ntiddle o~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lG
the interl::iection and the motorcycle came. He said he sa'v
the Inotorcycle just come into the intersection (R. 2432~16). He first saw the motorcycle when he was about
fifty feet west of I Street, but he heard the nwtorcycle J,
few seconds before he saw it, probably two or three
:-;econds. _He said he saw the motorcycle travel approxiInately twenty-five feet until it hit the automobile (R.
253-254). He said he saw the motorcycle swerve to the
west and the next thing he saw was the girl go through
the air. He judged from watching the motorcycle travel
twenty-five feet that it was going between forty and fifty
1niles an hour. lie said the girl just sailed through the
air like "Superman" and lit on the inside of the curb
on the northwest corner. He said the girl was lying then~
conscious and Mr. Green staggered around and said
"Come on, kid, let's get the hell out of here." and the
plaintiff said:

"I hate you. I hate you. I told you to slack
up 1nany times." (R. 250).
When asked how long before the trial he spoke to
anyone about the case, he said:
"Oh, maybe three weeks or a month. I ain't
just quite sure. I don't keep track of it because
I had forgot about the accident since last fall because I didn't think we would be called in for it."
(R. 255).
Ellen Ahnberg, the wife of Carl Ahnberg, was with
him in the front seat. She didn't see the accident, but
she did go over to where the plaintiff was lying and
screaming. Myrna said: "Don't let me die." l\lyrna
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:1.-'.~<·d ~~ r:-; ..\hnberg

to tell her hoy friend. She told ~Irs .
.\lmberg that her back hurt and her leg hurt. ~Irs. Ahnherg said .Mr. Green cmne up and said:
ome on. Let's get the hell out of here."
said:
1

"(

anfl

~~ yrna

"l hate you. I hate you. I told you not to go
so fast.'' (R. 293-296).
Bert Singleton, a policeman, the mnbulance driver,
after he picked the girl up she cmnplained that
her leg was in great pain and on several occasions during
the ride to the hospital said that she had asked the driver
to ~low dmvn (R. 301). :Myrna Rodriguez, after the accident was under shock (R. 199). The ambulance caine and
took her to the General Hospital. When she woke up she
found she had a cast on her leg. The hospital report
:-;l10ws that she had a compound fracture of the right tibia
and fibula, distal third, and fracture of the right first
metatarsal and fifth proximal phalanx of the right foot,
that she had wounds beneath the right knee and multiple
lacerations, abrasions and ecchymoses over the body
(Exhibit 10). She was in the hospital for over two weeks
( R. 199-202).
te~tified

Dr. Lamb figured her permanent partial disability
would be from 5% to 7% (R. 120-121).
The plaintiff, :Myrna Rodriguez, testified that before
they reached I Street on their ride, she asked Mr. Green
if he would slow down, and that he did slow down, and
this was before they stopped for gas (R. 199). After
leaving the service station, .J1 yrna said he did not drive
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the Inotorcycle fast and he did not travel fa::;t an~· tiHH-'
going up I Street, and that .he, was driving reasonably
and carefully after he left the :service station and went
north ori I Street (H. 207) .. ' She \vas' positive s~w onlY
.
'

'

\

,_

~

told hi1n once to slow down (H. 209).
S~rATE:MEN1,

OF POINTS

rPu:;

r.~HICll

PLAINTIFF RELII.JH
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT, HAZEL CHASE, WAS NEGLIGENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THE COURT ERRED IN
FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO FIND THE ISSUES IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN
·REGARD TO THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK, INSTRUCTIONS
NOS. 1, 16, AND 17.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN INJECTING INTO THE CASE
THE QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF, LAST T\VO LINES OF
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 AND SUBDIVISIONS 3, 4, AND 6 OF
iNSTRUCTION NO. 17.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.

u REGARDING UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.
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ARGtT_MENT
POINT

I.~

THE DEFENDANT, HAZEL .CHASE, WAS NEGLIGENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THE COURT ERRED IN
FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO FIND THE ISSUES IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT.

plaintiff, Myrna Hodriguez, was a guest of Mr.
On'Pn, the driver of the Inotorcycle. She had no control
over him; she had no control over the operation of the
motor[·yele; therefore, the proximate cause of the colli~ion must be the sole negligence of her host to bar her
recovery frorn the defendant, :Mrs. Chase. On the other
hand, if the proxi1nate cause of the collision was either
(a) the sole negligence of the defendant, Mrs. Chase, or
(b) the concurrent negligence of Mr. Green and the defendant .Jlrs. Chase, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Capero·n v. Tuttle, 100 Utah 476, 116 P.(2d) 402.
The jury was unable to assess this case on that basis
due to the lower Court's erroneous instructions regarding
( 1) unavoidable accident, (:2) assumption of risk, and
(3) contributory negligence.
't,:le

Let us look to the record. I Street is a through highway and the east and west traffic on Eleventh A venue
is regulated by stop signs (~ee Exhibit 1).
41-6-7 +, Utah Code Annotated 1953:

Vehicle entering a through highway. - The
driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this
act at the entrance to a through highway and shall
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~0

yield the right-of-way to other vehicles ·which haV(-~
entered the intersection from said through higllway or which are approaching so closely on said
through highway as to constitute an immediatE'
hazard, but said driver having so yielded may
proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield the right-of-way to the vehiclf'
so proceeding into or across the throug:h highway.
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise
stop in obedience to a stop sign as required herein
at an intersection where a stop sign is erecterl
at one or more entrances thereto although not n
part of a through highway and shall proceed c~~l
tiously, yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop
which are within the intersection or approacl1ing
so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard,
but may then proceed.
Yernon Green, the operator of the motorcycle, was
the favored driver. IIe had a right to presu1ne that tlw
disfavored driver, Mrs. Chase, who was either coming
to a stop or who had stopped at the stop sign, would
allow hiin to pass. As he approached Eleventh Avenue, he
saw the Chase cai; and he knew there was a stop sign and
he took it for granted that if he could see the car, thr
car could see him, and knowing that he ,\·as favored with
a stop sign he proeeeded on. Bate:) r. Burns, 3 Utah 2nrl
180, 281 P(2d) 209; Comnb,-.· r. Perry, :2 Ftah 381, 275 P.
(2d) (iRO; Peterson 1'. Xielson, 9 l""tah 2nd 302~ 343 P(2d)
7i~1.

rrhe plaintiff realize~ that thi~ right of way i~ not
ah~olute and undPr pro1•<'l' ('irrnm~h:ln(·e~ the dif;fayored
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drin·1·, ~\I r:-;. ClH~:se, eould becmne the favored driver.
'I';) do ~o, she would have to comply with the provisions
ot' tl:.• statute. S!w must yield to vehicles not so obliged
to ~'top \\·hieh are within the intersection or approaching
-;o <·lo~el~- as to constitute an in1n1ediate hazard . .Uartin
.
r. S!e·vens, 1:21 etah -!84, 2-t:1 P(2d) 747.
Did the defendant, ~Irs. Chase, ever becmne the
The answer is "No.,, rrhe defendant,
~-.~ rs. ( 'has<•, knew the interseetion of I Street and
l~lpv,,nfl Avenue was a dangerous inter;:Jedion. She knew
ft::: visibility frmn the south vvas poor (R. 1G9-170),
;;~t,1 ~;~w l~new that the only place that she could expect
danger was fron1 the south. She stopped at the stop
~iga. ~he rould not hecmne the favored driver and prol'e,;;l until she had yielded to whatever vehicle was within
t::,, intcr~'edion or approaching so closely as to constitute
an immediate hazard. In order to detennine whether
or not there 'vas an innnediate hazard, she had to look
and also listen. The collision proved there was an iinmediate hazard. .Jf rs. Chase didn't hear the motorcyc!e
nor did ~he see it until the collision. She stated to the
officer that she had stopped right still, looked both ways,
and this nwtorcycle "came out of the blue." She felt the
motorcycle hit the car and fly across the street. She had
just barely started up (R. 137). She told the police offi-

[':lV()l'(•(1 driver~

<·er that right before the impact she was going five to ten
miles per hour (R. 140). She didn't hear the roar of the
motorcycle and she didn't see any lights coming over the
hill.
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This court has said on numerous occasions that a
driver of a vehicle is chargeable with what he would have
seen if he had looked. Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 P.
(2d) 680; Johnson 1./. Syme, 6 Utah 2nd 319, 313 P (2d)
468; Richards r. Anderson, 9 Utah 2nd 17, 337 P(2d)
59.
While the Utah cases do not con1e right out and say
so, it is reasonable to assume that the driver is chargeable with what he would have heard had he listened.
1:frs. Arrnstrong heard the roar of the motorcycle as
she approached the stop sign. She dramatically stated
that she heard the n1otorcycle as she approached the stop
sign to make her stop and she remembered sitting there
with "an apprehensive feeling as a fire engine makes yon
feel when you hear the noise you don't see" (R. 149-151).
Carl Ahnberg, a defense witness, clain1ed he first
savl'" the motorcycle as it was coming into the intersection
when he was fifty feet west of I Street, but he heard the
motorcycle a few seconds before he saw it, probably two
or three seconds (R. 253-254), so it appears certain that
the defendant should have heard this motorcycle.
Should the defendant have seen the motorcycle?
l~xhibit No. 2 is a photo, marked picture No. 1, and ·wa~
taken while the can1era was held about four feet three
inches front the ground at a point 155 feet south from the
center of Eleventh A venue. Exhibit No. 3, picture No. 2.
was taken front the same elevation 129 feet south of the
center of l~leventh Avenue. Exhibit No. -!, picture No.
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3, was taken 88 feet south from the center of I Street.
Exhibit No. 5, picture No. 4, was taken 9 feet east of the
stop sign and 3 feet north of the center of Eleventh
Avenue, looking southwesterly. Exhibit No. 6, picture
~ o. 5, was taken from the same place and looking southwesterly. Exhibit No. 7, picture No. 6, was taken 3 feet
north of the center of I Street and looking southwesterly.
I~xhibit No. 8, picture No. 7, was taken 3 feet north of
the center line of Eleventh A venue and 9 feet east of the
stop sign, looking northwest up Eleventh Avenue. Exhibit No. 9, picture No. 8, was taken east of I Street
intersection looking west. These pictures demonstrate
beyond a peradventure of a doubt that had Mrs. Chase
been looking, she could have observed the motorcycle
coming up I Street for a distance 1nuch over 155 feet
(R. 91-93).
1Ir. Green estimated his speed at twenty-five miles
per hour as he approached the intersection, and about
twenty 1niles per hour at the time of impact. His maximum speed going north on I Street was thirty miles per
hour (R. 233-234). Mr. Nichols, the schoolteacher, also
testified that the motorcycle was going at a reasonable
and safe speed and not over thirty miles per hour (R.
160-165). The only person that gives the plaintiff speed
of forty to fifty miles an hour was :\Ir. Ahnberg who
made his estimation of the speed from seeing the motorcycle travel approximately twenty-five feet (R. 253254). He said it was going forty to fifty miles an hour.
If :Mr. Green had been going that fast, the motorcycle
would never have stopped where it did.
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rJ~he

plaintiff in this case dofts not have to prove that
:1\Irs~ Cha:se, the defendant, was solely responsible for
the accident. Even if Mr. Green, the host driver for the
plaintiff, was negligent, that would not absolve I\lr~.
Chase's liability to the plaintiff. Suppose Mrs. Chase waf-:
suing :Mr. Green? The answer would be: She couldn't
recover because of her contributory negligence in failing
to look, failing to listen, and crossing the intersection
before she could determine that a northbound vehicle was
not an immediate hazard.
The plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdiet
against the defendant.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN
REGARD TO THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK, INSTRUCTIONS
NOS. 1, 16, AND 17.

In Instruction No. 1, the court in setting out the defendant'~ contention, instructed as follows:
As a seeond affinnative defense the defendant
alleges that the plaintiff herself was guilty of
contributory negligence which proxiinately contributed to her injuries and as a third affirmative
defense that the plaintiff entered upon the trip
·with her driver Vernon Green and that she by
reason of the ei rcumstances assumed the risk of
in;jur~- and damage to her person under certain
circumstances as follows:
(a) By continuing to ride on the motoreyclf•
\rhen it was being driven at an exeessive rate of
speed and in a manner showing that the driver
could not control it. or hring it to a ~top in tlu·
<'VI'Jlt of danger~ and
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(b) Also by failing to protest and failing
to get off the vehicle before the accident occurred~
(R. 45-46).
Instruction No. 16.
There is a legal principle cornnwnly referred
to by the tenu ''assumption of risk," which is as
follows:
One is said to assume a risk when she voluntarily manifests her assent to the creation or
maintenance of a dangerous condition and voluntarily exposes herself to that danger, or when she
knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care "'\vould
know, that a danger exists in either the condition
of nnot:wr, or in the condition, use, or operation
l)f property and voluntarily places herself or re-mains, within the position of danger.
One who has thus assumed a risk is not entitled to recover for damages caused her without
intention and which results from t 11e dangerous
<'ondition or conduct to which she thus exposed
herself. (R. 63).
Then the court again repeated the a~sumption of
ri:-:k in ~ubdivision G of Instruction No. 17:
If the plaintiff rtssumed the risk of danger
111entioned elsewhere in these instructions and it
/Cas the ]Jroximate ca~tse of her injuri·es she cannot recover.

This was the second ride that the plaintiff, J\Iyrna
Bodriguez, had ever had on a motorcycle. At one point
before they reached I Street, she asked :Jlr. Green if he
would slow down. This was before they stopped for gas
1 R. 199).
After that, Myrna said he did not drive the
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motorcycle fast and he did not go fast up I Street, and
that he was driving reasonable and careful. Mr. Green
testified that as he turned onto Third A venue, he started
picking up speed and the plaintiff asked him to slow
down and he did.
Mrs. Chase and other witnesses testified to the hysterical statements made by the plaintiff while she \Ya~
in a state of shock with a broken leg. The testimony
of Mr. Nichols, the schoolteacher, was that the rnotorcycle
was going at a reasonable and safe speed up I Street.
The physical facts, that is the distance the rnotorcycle
went after the collision, show that :.Mr. Green was not
going at an excessive speed.
This court in the cases of Clay t:. Dunford, 121 lTtal1
177, 239 P(2d) 1075, and Johnson 1: ...Uaynard, 9 rtal1
2nd 268, 342 P(2d) 884, has ably discussed the theory
and development of the doctrine of the assurnption of
risk and also has discussed the conunon error of some
courts to confuse contributory negligence with assumption of risk. As was said in Clay 'C. Du uford, supra:
"It is necessary that the plaintiff not only
knew and appreciated the danger, but voluntarily
put herself in the way of it."
Or putting it in another way, it must clearly show (1) a
palpably dangerous condition, (2) knowledge and appreciation of the danger, and (3) a voluntary act by plaintiff
showing that he was willing to take the chance.
As

wa~

said in Jolinso.ll c. llla.1nzard, supra:
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''The fundamental consideration underlying
it is that one should not be permitted to knowingly and voluntarily incur an obvious risk of personal harm when he has the ability to avoid doing
so, and then hold another responsible for his injur~·. Its essential elements are: knowledge of a
danger and a free and voluntary consent to assurne it."
.\s was said in the sarne case:

"Under any reasonable view of the evidence
here the conduct of the plaintiff would not fall
within the requisites of the doctrine of assumption
of risk. This was the type of hazard which would
exist at practically every intersection where there
is rnuch traffic."
1t is i1nportant to recall that in the assumption of
ri~k case there truly must be recognized by the plaintiff
the sp('cific risk that he was taking. A general knowledge
nf the danger or hazard of his occupation will not suffice.
f(iugu·ell v. Hart, 275 P(2d) 431, Supreme Court of
\Vashington, October 15, 1954. This case discusses as~nmption of risk. Here the plaintiff was being driven by
defendant in defendant's car. Defendant became sleepy
and plaintiff knew he was sleepy. Finally the defendant

went to sleep and the automobile left the highway, seriously injuring plaintiff. The case was tried and the court
found that defendant was negligent in falling asleep
and the plaintiff voluntarily assumed any and all risks
and dangers in riding in defendant's automobile at the
time of the accident. The case was dismissed. Supreme
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Court reversed the. case and ~emanded it to determi;H·
plaintiff's damages. The court held that
"(1) The doctrine of assumption of risk as it i~

ordinarily understood is not· applicable under
a tort case like the one at bar, because of
the absence of 1naster and servant or o~~1cr
contractual relationships. rrlle designa~imt
'voluntary exposure to unreasonable risk' i~
nwre nearly correct, in that it implies tl-::e elPrnent of wilful assent expressed by t}re maxiHl
volenti non fit injuria-no wrong is done t(l
one who consents.
( 2) rrhe inquiry in a tort ra~e, presenti:1g tL,
issues raised on this appeal n1ay include thre<'
questions : Did plaintiff ( 1) ln1m~~ of anr1
appreciate the danger or risk involved, and
also (2) did he voluntarily cons2nt to exvJ~~(·
himself to it 'voluntarily' including the meaning that defendant's conduct has left plaintift a reasonable election or alternative, and
(3; was the exposure unreasonable, that i:-:.
was it such that a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would not expose himself to
it, or, after accepting a reasonable risk, did
plaintiff exercise proper care for his own protection against that risk."

l_n nwst of the ease~ this assurnption of risk wa.,;
either direeted against the guest in favor of a host driver
or in eases of one driver against another. There are very
few eases wherein the third party has endeavored to avail
himself of this doetrine against the guest. One of the few
eases

i~

King v. City of Long Beaeh, District Court of

Appeals, Herond Distrid California, 19--t-+.1 :)3 P ( ~ l) --t--F)_
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Hankins was a guest of the driver ICing. King drove in
h~ae!\o::t without lights at high speed. Hankins didn't objf' ·t to speed and Hankins had two opportunities to get
out before the accident. King collided with a car driven
hy a policeman of the City of Long Beach. The court
~aid:

''I Iankins was bound to exercise ordinary care
for his own safety. \Vhether or not he exercised
~uch care is primarily a question of fact. The trial
<·,~urt has decided that question against the plaintiff .... Fnder such circumstances the finding may
not he disturbed."

T:1c above case was not decided on the theory of assumption of risk but strictly on the theory of contributory
negligence.
The "assuu1ption of risk" doctrine inserted into this
\\·as not justified by either the law or the evidence,
and it constituted prejudicial error.

~·a~e

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN INJE.CTING INTO THE CASE
"i'HE QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF, LAST TWO LINES OF
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 AND SUBDIVISIONS 3, 4, AND 6 OF
INSTRUCTION NO. 17.

Instruction No. 13 was a correct statement of the law.
The Court stated in the first paragraph that the negligence of Green would not bar plaintiff's recovery unless
his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident; it went on to say that if both Mr. Green and the
defendant, Mrs. Chase, were negligent plaintiff would be
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entitled to recover. The prejudicial part of the instruction then follows:
"unless she was also negligent which proximately
contributed to the collision.''
There was no evidence as to any negligence of the plaintiff, 1\Iyrna Rodriguez. She was a guest.
We have discussed the assumption of risk, supra,
and can see that the plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent in assuming any risk. The jury was given the
idea that somewhere along the line she contributed to the
accident. They might have thought she was negligent
by not jumping off the motorcycle. The jury might have
felt that she was guilty of contributory negligence by
even getting on a motorcycle. What possibly could have
been her contributory negligence~
The words complained of took all the meaning out of
Instruction No. 13. Theodore Roosevelt often used the
term "weasel words" to designate words that suck all
the life out of the words next to them, just as a weasel
sucks an egg and leaves the shell.
Then in Instruction No. 17 in subdivisions 3 and 4:

3. If all three parties were negligent and
each proximately contrilmted to the plaintiff's
injuries tl1en the plaintiff cmmot recot·er.
4. If the plaintiff u·as negligent and it u·ns
a pro.rimate cause of her injuries she cannot recover.
Thus, contributory negligence was again injected into the
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case. These instructions on contributory negligence tend(•(l to divert the minds of the jurors from the fact that the
plaintiff would be entitled to recover if the accident was
caused hy the sole negligence of the defendant or by the
concurrent negligence of Mr. Green and the defendant.
They suggested to the jury that s01newhere along the line,
in son1e Inanner that could only be discerned by the trial
court, the plaintiff might have been contributorily negligent. They practically amounted to an argument by the
eourt. These instructions had no more place in this case
than a lecture by the court to the jury on the evils of
motorcycles and delinquency of teenagers, and the result
was just as prejudicial as though such a lecture had been
given.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.
5 REGARDING UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.

Jury should not ordinarily be given instruction on
unavoidable accident. Such an instruction is unnecessary,
hecause a defense of unavoidable accident is nothing more
than a denial by the defendant of negligence, or a contention that his negligence, if any, was not the proximate
eause of the injury, and the ordinary instructions on
negligence and proximate cause sufficiently show that
plaintiff must sustain his burden of proof on these issues
in order to recover. Such an instruction is also confusing, because the jury may get the impression that unavoidability is an issue to be decided and that, if proved,
it constitutes a separate ground of nonliability of the
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def~nda,n t, and th~ .r;ule,s•

GO.:Q.Cen;ting neg~igence and pi'oximat~ causat~on are in the1llselve~ complicated and difficult to understand. B,,utigarz, v. Yellqw Cab Co., 320 P(2d)
500, 65.. ALR .2d 1 . (Qal. 1958), :oyerr,uling prior decisio:1
to the contrary.
The.Jie. is. :no evidence in this case to support such an
instruction. This accident occurred in an intersection and
it was due to the negligence of either Mr. Green, :Mr~.
Chase, or both. The instruction serves no useful purposP
and it overemphasizes the defense of the defendant and it
was confusing. It amounts to the court giving an argument for the defense.

vVe call the court's attention to the annotation following the Butigan case in ALR. This annotation is over
one hundred pages, and deals with this question thoroughly. The annotation has endeavored to list almost
every conceivable facet and list the cases where the instruction may be given, where it. can't be given, where
the instruction is proper under certain evidence, where
it is error to give the instruction unless there is evidence
to support it, etc. The writers respectfully submit that
the theory advanced by the California Supreme Court
in the Butigan case is proper and should be followed by
thi~ Court. However, there seems to be no doubt that
to give this instruction where there is no evidence to
justify it is error.
\Vhat cmuplicates this ease 1nore than the ordinary
tlw fact that the plaintiff is a guest. For instance, the
theory of HO~tw ('ourt~ iH that if the defendant i8 free from
i~
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neglig-PHee it should be given. In the guest case that could
~o

both ways. Tn the guest case if the jury believed that
the host driver was not negligent then it might feel that
it :-;hould find an unavoidable accident even though the
third party were negligent.
The instruction in this case was uncalled for, confusing, and prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
This Court has again and again connnitted itself to
doctrine that the driver of a vehicle is chargeable
with what he would have seen had he looked. The defendant was the disfavored driver. She stopped at the stop
~ign, and without looking or deter1nining what vehicle
eoming up I Street 1night be a hazard, proceeded blindly
across the intersection. This conclusion is inescapable.
The testimony and the pictures confinn this. However,
owing to the erroneous action of the lo·wer Court in
injecting (a) assun1ption of risk, (b) contributory neglig-ence, and (c) unavoidable accident, the plaintiff as far as
the jury was concerned lost her favored position of being
a guest. She was placed on the smne footing as her host
driver, Green. The jury, confused by the instructions, held
that way.

t :1('

In view of this Court's previous decisions, it follows
that the lower Court erred in instructing the jury as to
assmnption of risk, which decisions were called to the
lower Court's attention in the nwtion for new trial. It
has been a custom in this locality for defendants to ask
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for and receive in ahnost every tort case the instruction
on unavoidable accident. The plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court should hold that this instruction
should never be given unless the evidence in fact showed
that the accident could have been "\vhat we term "unavoidable."
The plaintiff further contends that there was not a
scintilla of evidence on which to base the instructions
on contributory negligence.
The plaintiffs respectfully sub1nit that the Court
should reverse this case and hold that the defendant was
negligent as a n1atter of law, leaving only the damages
to be detennined. However, if the Court feels that there
is a jury question on defendant's negligence, then remand the case for a ne:w trial under proper instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY S. McCARTY &
SUMNER J. HATCH

.Atto'l'neys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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